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Abstract: We explore the efficiency of the forward reichsmark market in Vienna between
1876 and 1914. We estimate ARIMA models of the spot exchange rate in order to forecast the
one-month-ahead spot rate. In turn we compare these forecasts to the contemporaneous
forward rate, i.e., the market’s forecast of the future spot rate. We find that shortly after the
introduction of a “shadow” gold standard in the mid-1890s the forward rate became a
considerably better predictor of the future spot rate than during the prior flexible exchange
rate regime. Between 1907 and 1914 forecast errors were between a half and one-fourth of
their pre-1896 level. This implies that the Austro-Hungarian Bank’s policy of defending the
gold value of the currency was successful in improving the efficiency of the foreign exchange
market.
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1Using ARIMA Forecasts to Explore the Efficiency of the Forward Reichsmark
Market: Austria-Hungary, 1876-1914
Introduction
Austria-Hungary was on a flexible exchange-rate regime throughout most of the late
19th century, and the value of its currency, the florin, fluctuated markedly, - in a range of
about ± 7 percent. In order to stabilize the florin, a gold standard was adopted in 1892 (de
jure), though without an immediate effect, because convertibility was not introduced.
However, in early 1896, the exact date remains unclear - , the Austro-Hungarian Bank began
a policy of maintaining the new currency’s legal parity with gold (Figure 1). We concluded in
previous studies that the efficiency in the foreign exchange market increased markedly after
the currency was stabilized in early 1896, and the Bank enforced a de facto target zone around
parity of ± 0.4%. The forward premium became a much better predictor of future exchange
rates (Flandreau and Komlos, 2001a; 2001b).   
The present study explores the efficiency of the forward reichsmark market in Vienna
from a different perspective. Insofar as the beginning of the month forward rate, ft, was the
market’s forecast of the end of the month spot rate, yt+1, our previous tests measured how
effectively ft predicted yt+1. A limitation of these tests is, of course, that economic conditions
could well change during the intervening one-month interval. Hence, the accuracy of the one-
month-ahead market forecasts depended not only on the efficiency with which information
was used at time (t), but also the degree to which economic fundamentals might have
perturbed the money markets in the meanwhile. In order to attempt to circumvent this
conceptual problem, we now turn to an alternative method to test the accuracy with which ft
predicted yt+1. We use only information available to the market participants at time (t), the
date at which ft was determined, by estimating an ARIMA model for the spot rate up to and
including yt. Our goal is to ascertain the accuracy of the market forecasts over time, and how
2that accuracy changed after 1896. We then compare the ARIMA forecasts of yt+1 to the
market’s forecasts at t, ft.
Before estimating an ARIMA model we test for stationarity of both (ask and bid) spot
rate (y) series for 1870.1 to 1876.11, as well as for the two sub-periods 1870.1-1895.12 and
1896.1-1914.8. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is:
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Stationarity is rejected for the period 1870.01-1876.08, as well as for 1870.01-
1895.12, but not for the subsequent period 1896.01-1914.08.2 Hence, we proceed by
differencing the series in the first period prior to estimating the ARIMA model for the spot
rate series, but estimate an ARMA model for the second period. The partial autocorrelation
function for 1870-1895 indicate that either an ARIMA (2,1,1) or an ARIMA ([1,12],1,0)
model would be appropriate (see Appendix). We estimated both models, but inasmuch as the
two results are virtually identical, only the latter is presented here in detail. The model
estimated is:
(1.2) 1 1 2 12t t ty y yβ β− −∆ = ∆ + ∆
Because the forward rate was first published in 1876.11, the initial estimate of Eq. (1.2)
is for the period 1870.1 to 1876.11. We then use θβ ˆ,ˆ i  to forecast the end of the month spot
rate, yˆ 1876.12, and compare it with the market’s forecast, f1876.11. We thereby obtain a residual,
an estimate of the market forecast error:
(1.3) 1876.11eˆ = (f1876.11 - yˆ 1876.12)
which also includes a transaction cost. The information set is subsequently updated by one
month, a new model is estimated, a new forecast is made, and a new forecast residual, 1876.12eˆ ,
is calculated. We thus obtain a forecast residual for each month of the period until the de facto
end of the flexible exchange-rate regime in early 1896. We proceed similarly for the (shadow)
3gold-standard era (1896.1 to 1914.7), and subsequently compare the sum of the estimated
forecast residuals 
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∑   under the flexible and the gold-standard exchange regimes in order
to gauge the extent to which the forecast residuals changed during the two periods. We obtain
thereby a measure of the accuracy of the forward rates using only information available to the
market on the day the forward rate was determined.
Results
The estimated coefficients of the ARIMA ([1,12],1,0) model are small and unstable at the
beginning of the period under consideration in 1876.11 (Figure 2). However, the coefficients
settle down shortly, and within about 18 months become quite stable.3  The short term
memory, 1β , is both very close to zero and not statistically significant, implying that the spot
rate series is practically a random walk in the first differences,4 but  the seasonal component,
2β , is statistically significant, implying that there was a seasonal component to the series. The
ARIMA forecasts are virtually indistinguishable from the actual spot rates on the scale given
in Figure 3. However, the residuals, εˆ , do fluctuate quite a bit during the flexible-exchange-
rate regime (Figure 4) and have a mean value of 0.035 fl (bid) and 0.051 fl (ask) (Table 3).
This provides an estimate of the order of magnitude of the transaction costs as well as a
standard to which the performance in the subsequent shadow-gold-standard period can be
compared. (Note that the ask series began to be published in 1889; the results of the bid/ask
series are virtually identical, and consequently we are not including the post-1896 ask forecast
errors in Figure 4.)
During the gold standard period the best fit is provided by an AR(1) model with a highly
significant coefficient close to 1 (not shown here). The forecast residuals do not improve at all
immediately after 1896 (Figure 4); actually they do not do so until the end of 1898, implying
that it took about two years for the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Bank to gain credibility,
and for the market to learn to forecast the spot rates more accurately than during the prior
4regime. In fact, the previously used ARIMA ([1,12]1,0) model truly forecasts better during
the transition period than does the AR(1) model. However, by 1899, the forward rates became
a much better forecasts of the future spot rates than under the flexible exchange rate period
(Figure 4). The range of the residuals using the AR(1) model is considerably smaller (0.20 bid
and 0.25 ask) than under the previous exchange rate regime (0.71 bid and 0.37 ask). The mean
of the residuals was about halved, and their standard deviation became about one-third of their
previous values (Table 3). This suggests that the forward rates were a much more accurate
predictors of the future spot rates under the shadow gold-standard period with smaller
transaction costs than during the flexible exchange-rate regime.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the residuals were declining over time between 1899 and
October of 1907 by about –0.00026 florin per month (bid), whereas during the flexible
exchange rate period they either remained constant (ask) or even increased (bid) (Table 4).
This implies that the market participants were able to improve their forecasts over time, while
at the same time transaction costs were decreasing. The policy of the Austro-Hungarian Bank
to support the florin must have been gaining in credibility. However, by October of 1907 the
market’s ability to improve its forecasts reached its limits: the forecast errors remained
constant thereafter (Table 4) and remained at a very low level (Table 3). Forecast errors after
October 1907 averaged about 0.015 florin – about half of the level between 1899 and 1907.
Conclusion
We estimated ARIMA models of the reichsmark/florin exchange rate for the period
1870-1914. In turn, these models were used to forecast the one-month-ahead spot rates, and
subsequently compared to the forward rate of the reichsmark, the market’s forecast of the
future spot rate. We found that within about three years after the introduction of the shadow-
gold standard the forward rate became a considerably better predictor of the future spot rate
than during the prior flexible exchange rate regime. In addition, a certain learning took place
on part of market participants in as much as the ability of the market to forecast the future rate
5improved over time. Although by 1907 the improvement came to an end, forecast errors
stayed at a low level until 1914. Between 1907 and 1914 forecast errors were between a half
and one-fourth of their pre-1896 level. This implies that the Austro-Hungarian Bank’s policy
of defending the gold value of the currency was quite successful in improving the efficiency
of the foreign exchange market.
6                         Figure 1.  The Florin/Mark Exchange Rate. Florins / 100 Marks, 1870-1914
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Figure 2. Estimated Coefficients of the ARIMA ([1,12]1,0) Model
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7Figure 3. The Forward Rate and Forecasts of the Spot Rate (Bid)
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8Figure 4. Market Forecast Residuals 
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9Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller-Tests for Spot Rate bid series
Period 0α 2α γ DW N
1870.01-1876.10 -0.10
(-0.0429)
0.0087
(1.7762)
-0.0049
(-0.1306)
1.979 80
1870.01-1895.12 2.49**
(2.6100)
0.0006
(1.4215)
-0.0443
(-2.6536)
1.996 310
1896.01-1914.08 7.33**
(3.5526)
0.0001
(0.6472)
-0.1252**
(-3.5695)
2.030 224
Level of significance: ** 5 percent, t-values in parenthesis.
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller-Tests for Spot Rate Ask series
Period 0α 2α γ DW N
1870.01-1876.10 0.0890
(0.0373)
0.0086
(1.6733)
-0.0082
(-0.2044)
1.983 80
1870.01-1895.12 2.5793**
(2.6261)
0.0006
(1.4151)
-0.0458
(-2.6695)
1.996 310
1896.01-1914.08 7.6353**
(3.6463)
0.0001
(0.9371)
-0.1303**
(-3.6628)
2.030 224
Level of significance:  ** 5 percent; t-values in parenthesis.
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Table 3. Performance of the Forward Market:
Descriptive Statistics of the Forecast Residuals
Period Type ARIMA Miniumum Maximum Range Mean Standard Number of
of Rate Model Value Value Value Deviation Months
1876-1895 Bid [1,12],1,0 -0.28 0.43 0.71 0.035 0.097 230
1889-1895 Ask [1,12],1,0 -0.11 0.26 0.37 0.051 0.088 78
1876-1895 Bid 2,1,1 -0.48 0.79 1.27 0.035 0.102 230
1889-1895 Ask 2,1,1 -0.21 0.28 0.49 0.053 0.080 78
1876-1895 Bid [1,12],1,1 -0.31 0.43 0.74 0.034 0.100 230
1889-1895 Ask [1,12],1,1 -0.10 0.26 0.36 0.051 0.088 78
1899-1914 Bid 1,0,0 -0.08 0.12 0.20 0.022 0.031 188
1899-1914 Ask 1,0,0 -0.13 0.12 0.25 0.022 0.032 188
1899-1907.10 Bid 1,0,0 -0.03 0.11 0.14 0.028 0.027 106
1899-1907.10 Ask 1,0,0 -0.04 0.12 0.16 0.029 0.027 106
1907.11-1914 Bid 1,0,0 -0.08 0.12 0.20 0.015 0.032 82
1907.11-1914 Ask 1,0,0 -0.13 0.12 0.25 0.013 0.035 82
Table 4. Estimated Trend of the Residuals
Period Model Type of Constant Slope F
Rate
1876-1895 [1,12],1,0 Bid 0.016 0.00017* 3.084*
(1.22) (1.76) t-statistic
1889-1895 [1,12],1,0 Ask 0.038* 0.00032 0.52
(1.9) (0.72) t-statistic
1899-1907.10 1,0,0 Bid 0.043*** -0.00026*** 9.855***
(8.30) (-3.14) t-statistic
1,0,0 Ask 0.044*** -0.00029*** 12.17***
(8.64) (-4.28) t-statistic
1907.11-1914 1,0,0 Bid 0.012 0.00002 0.015
(0.55) (0.12) t-statistic
1,0,0 Ask 0.017 -0.00003 0.25
(0.70) (-0.158) t-statistic
Significance level: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.
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Appendix
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ACF Spot Rate, Ask (1896-1914)
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1 We would like to thank the Ulf-Christian Ewert and Jörg Winne for their assistance with the
computations.
2 The critical values are -3.4 (at the 5% level), and -3.1 (at the 10% level).
3 This points possibly to a learning process at the beginning of the period under consideration.
It is not known when the forward market came into being, we only know that the forward
rates were published beginning in 1876.11. The learning process leads to the inference that
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the market might have been created at around that time so that agents first needed some time
to learn to forecast the future spot rate, as after the introduction of the new regime after 1896.
4 The coefficients of the (2,1,1) model are similarly insignificant.
